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Chapter 1
THE ETHNOGRAPHIC SELF AS
RESOURCE: AN INTRODUCTION
Peter Collins and Anselma Gallinat 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide, briefly, the disciplinary context
in which the idea of the self as resource in doing ethnography has
emerged. We will delineate the relevant developments in the discipline
with particular regard to ‘anthropology at home’, the reflexive turn and
auto-ethnography. We will briefly introduce the work of scholars who
already apply the kind of integrative approach we propose and then go on
to detail the implications of such research and writing for methodology
and the discipline at large. These include issues such as authenticity,
‘playing the native card’, memory and memorisation, ethics and honesty,
and the question of whether this may lead from an anthropological
‘double vision’ to a ‘split personality’. Throughout we shall relate this
volume’s chapters to this discussion and the overall thesis. 
Making Visible: the Ethnographer Brought into Focus
The assumption that we can better understand ourselves through
understanding others has a long history. It suffices to say here that this
apparently simple thought was the seed that slowly developed into what we
now call anthropology. By 1900, intrepid individuals were leaving home
with the intention of understanding other ways of life. To cast matters in
black and white, there was a time, before 1970, when anthropology was
almost entirely a matter of isolating the other. The person or self of the
anthropologist remained unseen and mostly unheard. Like the movies, the
conceit was that we (the viewer, the reader) had direct, unmediated access to
the lives before us, that is, without the facilitating role of film crew, director,
editor and so forth. The film gives us an objective representation of life itself.
But there’s the rub – it was the realisation that ethnography is representation,
or life at least once removed, that caused what was and continues to be a
reappraisal of the anthropological enterprise. The present volume is set in
that tradition of reappraisal.
The adage was that anthropology sought to understand the other – at
least partly in order better to know oneself. This approach to anthropology
was epistemologically grounded in a fairly straightforward scientism. Here
was the anthropologist and over there, ontologically discrete and entirely
separate from him or her, were the objects of his or her attention – the other.
Anthropology was a science, maybe not quite like physics or chemistry but
similar enough to claim, or at first assume, a measure of objectivity in its
practice. Anthropological accounts of others were therefore fundamentally
realist. The aim of the fieldworker was to collect, accumulate, classify and
analyse social facts. Language was considered a neutral tool that enabled the
anthropologist to identify social phenomena and describe them exactly and
truthfully. The discipline overall should be the accumulation of these facts.
The personal identity of the anthropologist was an unimportant detail,
though best practice assumed that the anthropologist, commencing their
observations from outside of the frame should ensure that they took
precautions to stay out. This is not to say that they chose to remain separate
from the action during fieldwork. After all, at least since Malinowski’s work
on the Trobriand Islands, anthropological practice involved more or less
systematic participant observation: the anthropologists should live among
those whose lives they were attempting to understand for an extended
period of time. But this was a practical strategy and was understood as a
principle that distinguished the modern anthropologist from the Victorian
armchair scholar who sifted through data gleaned by those – soldiers,
traders, missionaries, colonial administrators – who had travelled there
instead. It was certainly not a part of Malinowski’s plan that anthropologists
should place themselves in the ethnographic frame and he was careful to
erase, wherever possible, the traces of his own presence in the field. 
This means that, on the one hand, the anthropological endeavour
gained legitimacy from ‘being there’ so long as evidence of ‘doing there’
was eradicated. In the field it was necessary to be ‘with’ the other as only
in that way might one contextualise beliefs and practices in a holistic
account of another culture: ‘to realise his vision of his world’ (Malinowski
1961 [1922]: 25). But Malinowski did not consider it necessary to include
himself in his academic presentation of Trobriand life and kept his
personal feelings and observations to his diary. This diary, published
posthumously in 1967, is one of the more significant waymarks of our
current journey as it remains a painful reminder that doing ethnography is
inevitably intertwined with the rather subjective and deeply human being
in the field. 
2 The Ethnographic Self as Resource
Even those with just a passing acquaintance with the recent history of
anthropology will know that by the 1970s the character of ethnography had
undergone considerable change. For a variety of more or less connected
reasons, including the influence of the postmodern turn, anthropology
began to take a growing interest in the self of the anthropologist, or at least
in the relationship between self and other. The possibility that
anthropologists – and anthropology as an increasingly institutionalised
practice – may have had an impact on the representation of ‘an other’
culture gave rise to an increasing awareness of anthropologists’ position in
the field. There was a growing recognition that Radcliffe-Brown might have
been wrong and that the anthropologist can never be an entirely neutral
‘device’ for describing and explaining other cultures. The time had come
when anthropologists felt obliged to confront the uncomfortable fact that
they were always already implicated in ‘the field’; that they were,
inevitably, constructing what they came to re-present.
Writing Culture
Making room for the self in ethnography depended partly upon the
loosening of textual conventions. Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus
1986) has become iconic of significant and identifiable tendencies within
the discipline – including reflexivity as a necessary component of doing
fieldwork, the importance of critique, a growing interest in the textuality
of anthropology (the so-called ‘literary turn’), and the further possibility
of doing ‘anthropology at home’ by the time of its publication. Although
it would be overstating the case to cite Writing Culture as the cause of a
paradigm shift, the book undoubtedly presented the most concise and
subsequently most influential position statement of a new self-conscious
and critical anthropology. We will consider a number of these trends here:
reflexivity, ethnography as a form of writing, anthropology at home and
auto-ethnography, and the employment of anthropology as cultural
critique. We would argue that in one way or another each of these
tendencies relates more or less directly to the emergence of the
anthropologist’s self in their ethnography. The tendency among
anthropologists to attend more explicitly to the self was not merely a
product of anthropology. Giddens (1991) and others have shown that
reflexivity has been a part of the ambient climate of late modernity, a
practice that characterises the world view of not only scholars but also the
public at large. Indeed it might be argued that this text itself is another
example of the modern tendency to dwell reflexively on the self. 
Jay Ruby’s edited collection, A Crack in the Mirror (1982), preceded
Writing Culture by four years and anticipated some of the themes found
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there. The chapters in Ruby expertly indicate the inevitability of
subjectivity in the ethnographic account comparing this to the sphere of
cultural production. As the book aims to make the data-gathering process
transparent (1982: 18–19), there is the stark realisation that at the centre of
every ethnography lies the self of the anthropologist. From the 1970s on,
there has been a growing tendency to acknowledge this presence, to have
the anthropologist’s self step from behind the camera and acknowledge
her presence, both to herself and others (see also Coffey 1999). However,
as Dyck says in his chapter here, it is unfortunate that this reflexivity has
become a kind of reflex that is all too often confined to a preface or
introduction as the new badge of ethnographic legitimacy. The
information provided is often eclectic, limited and little commented upon
(Salzman 2002); the text proceeds as before and little is gained. The
actuality of the influence of the anthropologist’s self on data collection and
writing therefore tends, all too often, to be ghettoised and its
consideration not properly developed. As Kohn remarks, in this way
reflexivity also often appears rather static pointing to the anthropologist
as a similarly static filter of the observed culture. In this volume Collins
and Kohn make the case for a more processual form of reflexivity. 
There are several notable instances, however, in which the self-
awareness of the anthropologist has radically reshaped the form of their
ethnography. One thinks particularly of Rabinow’s Reflections on Fieldwork
in Morocco (1977), Dumont’s The Headman and I (1978), Crapanzano’s
Tuhami (1980), Shostak’s Nisa (1981), Dwyer’s Moroccan Dialogues (1982).
We should note Pratt’s observation (1986) that such accounts are often
secondary, following on from more standard objectivist texts – Rabinow,
for example, published Symbolic Domination (1975) two years before
Reflections (1977). It is also worth noting that earlier texts exist which point
towards these more experimental works – Sydney Mintz’s Worker in the
Cane (1960), for example. In these cases, a concerted attempt is being made
to foreground the dialogical nature of ethnography both as a fieldwork
practice and as published text. On the one hand, the voice of the other is
foregrounded and, on the other, the self of the anthropologist is made
explicitly and constantly present. Whatever these texts achieve, they
certainly confirm the impossibility of objectively representing,
ethnographically, an unproblematic other. In this volume Sˇikic´-Mic´anovic´
makes it equally clear that ethnographies, regardless of the details of their
production, are jointly constructed by the ethnographer and her research
participants and that the inclusion of the self of the ethnographer in the
field is, in many cases, a precondition of ethnography.
These realisations are clearly apparent in the 1990s which witnessed an
increasing use of self-narrative as well as biography in ethnography, for
example Okely and Callaway’s Anthropology and Autobiography (eds, 1992)
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and Reed-Danahay’s Auto/Ethnography: Rewriting the Self and the Social
(1997). More importantly, feminist monographs such as Abu-Lughod’s
Writing Women’s Worlds (1993) and Behar’s Translated Woman (1993)
showed how one could write experience-near ethnographies that reveal
subjectivity without losing academic credibility. 
A more recent example is Rapport’s short essay, ‘Hard-Sell or Mumbling
“Right” Rudely’ (1997). Here, Rapport places his self squarely at the centre
of the action. He is drawn, after receiving an invitation and promise
through the post, to a city centre hotel in the hope of receiving a substantial
prize of some sort. Rapport describes his slow and steady humiliation at
the hands of timeshare salesmen in a manner that is likely to cause his
reader both amusement and discomfort. Unsurprisingly, he leaves the
hotel after a gruelling and embarrassing two-hour ‘hard-sell’, with nothing
more than the continued and now heavily tarnished promise of that prize
– a prize that never materialises. Rapport offers an ‘experience-near’ auto-
ethnography, an account that many of his readers will feel uncomfortably
familiar with – the unfulfilled promise of free enterprise. Rapport’s work,
both in this essay and more generally (see especially Rapport 1994a),
reflects and develops a more explicit connection with forms of writing that
are traditionally thought of as ‘fiction’.
Even these examples suggest, by their heterogeneity, that ‘the literary
turn’, as it is often called, is hardly a coherent movement in anthropology.
There are at least three separate, though admittedly overlapping,
developments here. First, there is a movement towards experimentation in
the style of ethnographic writing itself. Perhaps the most notable examples
include Stephen Tylor’s essay in Writing Culture, along with the biographical
and dialogic examples cites above. If one accepts that ethnography is a ‘form
of writing’ (this is impossible to deny, even if one refuses to countenance
departures from the standard genre), then there is no reason not to
experiment with non-standard forms. Such experimentation has been taken
further in sociology than in anthropology under the label of ‘auto-
ethnography’. One might, for instance, look to the collections edited by Ellis
and Bochner (1996; see also their extended meditation on experimental
forms in Bochner and Ellis 2002). Their earlier collection include, for
example, an account of the life of a mentally retarded woman by her
(sociologist) daughter, a first-hand account of a bulimic, an extraordinary
case study in child sexual abuse and a wistful piece on the author’s father’s
journey across America in his Model T Ford in 1924. In each case, and despite
the apparent idiosyncrasy of the topics, the author draws on the quotidian in
order to illuminate more general themes.
In this collection, Dona and Dorothy Davis turn their attention to the
experience, and in particular their experience, of being identical twins. This
is as ‘experience-near’ as ethnography gets. They intimate, at one point, the
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possibility of existential unity, arguing, not that one individual may
contain several selves, but that two individuals may share, at least for an
instant, one self. In this case, and, indeed, in all cases here, experimental
writing takes a back seat as the form and content of ethnography as a
methodology are interrogated. Indeed, that case of the Davis twins’
contribution is especially interesting and indicates not only the tenacity of
the standard format of ethnographic writing but also its capacity to contain
even the most unusual fieldwork: perhaps this is due to its flexibility – or,
of course, to the ingenuity of the writer. 
The second movement is the treatment of ethnographic texts as texts.
During those years when the major paradigm in anthropology was
characterised by its scientificity there seemed no point in bringing the
ethnographic account itself under scrutiny. After all, texts in other
scientific disciplines did not undergo the lit. crit. treatment. Perhaps it
was the interpretive turn spurned by Clifford Geertz’ work (1973) that
prepared the ground for this possibility. Indeed, Geertz himself led the
way with what turned out to be his most controversial book – Works and
Lives (1988) – and Van Maanen published Tales of the Field (1988) in the
same year, both books dealing with the rhetorical devices employed by
influential anthropologists. Indeed the minor furore caused by Works and
Lives indicates the suspicion with which some anthropologists viewed
foregrounding anthropological writing (Spencer 1989). There have long
been texts that are in a sense ambiguous with respect to genre (think of
Bohannan 1954; Powdermaker 1966; Briggs 1970), which early on
highlighted the inevitable subjective nature of ethnography as method
and texts. If taken to its logical conclusion this realisation requires critical
reading. More recently, there have been texts that at one level at least may
well be seen to be fictional accounts, though each case needs to be treated
as something sui generis. We are thinking particularly of Michael Jackson’s
Barawa and the Ways Birds Fly in the Sky: An Ethnographic Novel (1986) and
Michael Taussig’s The Magic of the State (1997). Indeed, here are two
anthropologists, a New Zealander and an Australian, who most clearly
exemplify a kind of experimentation that the editors of Writing Culture
sought to encourage (though without providing specific direction).
Michael Jackson has published not only non-standard ethnography (1989,
1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2005) but also novels and volumes of poetry (1986).
And there is a continuity across genres in Jackson’s work, facilitated by an
existential perspective. Taussig, too, has been among the most
adventurous ethnographers. In Shamanism, Colonialism and the Wildman
(1987), he commends a certain ambiguity in ethnographic writing – at
least in dealing with the kind of field in which he works: 
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Killing and torture and sorcery are real as death is real. But why people do
these things, and how the answers to that question affect the question – that
is not answerable outside of the effects of the real carried through time by
people in action. That is why my subject is not the truth of being but the
being of truth, not whether facts are real but what the politics of their
interpretation and representation are. (1987: xiii)
It is evident from this passage that Taussig writes the way he does for a
purpose and that purpose is critique. Taussig is not unconcerned with
describing the everyday lives of Colombian people but he is considerably
more interested in the political consequences of what he describes along
with the moral and political standpoint adopted by the ethnographer.
Indeed, critique is a purpose of the ethnographic genre that is flagged by
several of those contributing to Writing Culture. Talal Asad had some time
before edited a collection of articles interrogating the political implications
of doing anthropology during what he called ‘the colonial encounter’
(1973). And, indeed, Marcus and Fischer’s Anthropology as Cultural Critique
was published in 1986 – the same year as Writing Culture. Marcus and
Fischer complain (p. 111) that recent accounts of ‘predicaments’ in
American culture ‘fail to take account of the existing domestic cultural
criticism’; indeed, ‘they are careless precisely about that which would be
sacred to anthropologists in considering other cultures – indigenous
accounts’. The chapters in this collection do not make the same mistake.
Rather, they consider their informants’ voices as well as their own
engagement with their informants as the core of ethnography. Nor do our
authors wish to continue to dwell overlong on the predicament of
ethnographic representation. In contrast, this volume seeks to take
ethnography a further step forward, rather in the manner of Bruner: ‘The
problem is now two-fold: on the one hand we want to continue and
deepen the critique, to correct its excesses, to explore and conceptualise
new facets of our predicament as ethnographers in a postcolonial post-
industrial era, on the other hand, we have to move ahead with the
common ethnographic enterprise’ (1993: 2).
Finally, a few anthropologists have begun to mine works of literature
for ethnographic data – this is fieldwork in fiction as it were and the third
movement in anthropology following the ‘literary turn’. Mary Douglas
has been carrying out such work for more than forty years, taking the
Bible as her primary source. Some readers will be critical of our
characterisation of the Bible as fiction; the case is clearer with regard to
Rapport’s work on/in E.M. Forster (Rapport 1994a), Paul Benson’s edited
collection (1993) and the work of Handler and Segal (1990). In relation to
the latter it is worth quoting from Rapport’s review of that text: ‘Jane
Austen’s consistent attention to the subtleties of social life allow her
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fictions to be compared to anthropological studies, in regard both to what
she represented and how it was narrated. Austen’s texts can be treated as
ethnographic data and so as analytic exemplars of intercultural
defamiliarization and intercultural translation’ (1994b: 216–217). Rapport
avers that fiction (or at least some fiction) can stand as ‘indigenous
accounts’. Strathern, in After Nature (1992), draws similarly on a number
of British writers, including Beatrix Potter, in order to illuminate national
understandings of kinship.
These developments not only shaped the writing of culture by
generating more experience-near accounts and cultural critique and by
facilitating a more considered exploration of the connections between
literature and anthropology, but clearly also had an impact on the doing of
ethnography in the field. The increasing legitimacy of ethnography
undertaken ‘at home’ constituted a further breach of the ‘normal
paradigm’.
Anthropology ‘At Home’
We can use Strathern as a tie here, as we consider the growing tendency of
anthropologists to carry out what is generally called ‘anthropology at
home’. As well as carrying out ethnographic research in Elmdon (Strathern
et al 1981), a village in Essex, and on English kinship more generally,
Strathern also posed some difficult questions for any who assumed that
doing anthropology at home was a straightforward matter. Her typically
subtle argument boils down to the claim that ‘We cannot conclude that
non-Western anthropologists will stand in the same relationship to their
own society of culture as a Western anthropologist does to his/hers’ (1987:
30). It is a question of there being different systems of self-knowledge from
one to the other. According to Strathern, the kind of self-knowledge system
existing among Mount Hageners, for example, prohibits one of their
number carrying out native anthropology in the way that a British citizen
might carry out anthropology at home among the British.1 But this is in any
case all too crude – in 2009, what can we possibly mean by ‘British culture’?
The important question here is the extent to which we can think of
ourselves as ‘native’ to any particular group (see Narayan 1993). What
kind of experience do we need to claim membership of a particular group,
category or community – what markers are required to be considered a
member by others? It is obviously not enough to be British to count oneself
a ‘native’ in regard to Coventry Sikhs. 
The unspoken rule in British and American anthropology was that one
‘went away’ to the field. Only by establishing significant physical distance
between one’s home and the field could sufficient objectivity be obtained.
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Fieldwork at home was considered the province of sociology. This sentiment
was further nurtured by an underpinning assumption that the country of
one’s birth represented a more or less homogeneous culture from which one
must escape in order to find a legitimate and equally homogeneous ‘other’.
American anthropologists had long studied ‘other cultures’ on their
doorstep – Native American Indians. British anthropologists, on the other
hand, were not so fortunate, and were expected to follow Radcliffe-Brown
and Malinowski to distant lands – in Oceania, Africa, Asia. From the late
1950s onward and for a variety of reasons – the increased cost of undertaking
fieldwork far from home, difficulties in obtaining research permits and the
growing awareness that in an increasingly multicultural Western society ‘the
other’ is all around us – anthropologists were increasingly turning to
geographically closer groups and places (Jackson 1987). 
Max Gluckman, in Manchester, was an early proponent of ‘anthropology
at home’ and influenced his students in their choice of field site, including
Frankenberg (1957). Littlejohn’s Westrigg (1963) was a further notable
contribution to the anthropology of Britain, which dried up rather before a
rebirth in Manchester during the 1980s (Cohen 1982, 1986, 1987; Rapport
1993, 1994a). Some Manchester scholars undertook fieldwork in factories
and in public institutions, further breaking down what it was to ‘do
anthropological fieldwork’. It is worth noting, further, that those among
Gluckman’s students, including Turner, Van Velsen, Epstein, Mitchell and
others, who continued to work ‘away from home’ in situations of very rapid
social change experimented freely with both fieldwork methods and the
construction of ethnographic texts. Messerschmidt (1981) and later Moffat
(1992) broached the subject from an American point of view. 
The tendency to stay ‘at home’ has presented anthropology with a
number of challenges. For instance, the accountability of the anthropologist
to those they have studied is more pressing – particularly when research
participants speak the language in which the ethnography is written and
may obtain copies (see Brettel 1993). Furthermore, at home the impact of
one’s research, because of its greater accessibility, might be very great
indeed – in either a positive or negative way. As a result the administration
of research ethics has grown apace.
Since the 1980s the conduct of ethnography in the country of one’s
upbringing is no longer especially contentious within the discipline. It is
probably no coincidence that the majority of authors gathered here have
carried out fieldwork ‘at home’. The question of whether one ‘should’
carry out research away from home in the first instance, as claimed by
Jackson (1987: 14), seems to us increasingly irrelevant. As Strathern points
out (1987: 16), ‘the preliminary question [is] of how one knows when one
is at home’. Collins (2002) has written about this matter in relation to his
fieldwork among British Quakers, arguing that one is never simply ‘at
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home’, and the assumption of the role of ethnography is enough to create
a sense of difference if that is felt to be required for epistemological
reasons. Obviously, there are also shades of ‘at homeness’. Gallinat, in this
volume, refers to that collective memory of times past – Ostalgia – the
ambivalent feeling of Germans who were, until 1990, East Germans.
Having grown up in East Germany, Gallinat experienced events and
emotions, circumstances and situations much in the same way as many of
her research participants. She is perfectly able to remember these
experiences and presents them alongside the experiences of others.
However, she is equally aware of the responsibility she has as an
anthropologist to hold up her own as well as others’ accounts for critical
inspection. Whatever the degree one feels ‘at home’, however, there is
always the possibility of drawing on significantly similar experiences to
those one is working with in the field. As such, we would argue that a
shared sense of a particular past as a means of drawing directly on one’s
own experiences is less a guarantor of than a stimulus for constructing
worthwhile ethnography.
Interestingly, while Strathern acknowledges the likelihood of a greater
reflexivity of those conducting fieldwork ‘at home’ (pp. 17–19), she omits
consideration of the ethnographer’s self as a resource that could further
aid their investigation. However, she critically reflects on the possibility
that those being studied ‘at home’ may feel that they are being exploited
– why should they think so? We need at this point, then, to distinguish
between the ethics of using oneself as a resource and carrying on our
ethnographic research at home – they do not amount to the same thing,
even though they are likely to overlap in practice. 
Strathern refers to ‘anthropology at home’ as ‘auto-anthropology’
(1987). This usage of the terminology is not typical. More often, ‘auto-
ethnography’, rather than ‘auto-anthropology’, is used in reference to
fieldwork in which the ethnographic self is the only informant involved, as
explained above. The growth of such autobiographical accounts has been
exponential since 1990 (Ryang 2000), though such texts remain rare in
anthropology. The pieces in this collection rely, without exception, on
accounts drawn from both self and others. We do not seek to argue the
benefits of auto-ethnography, though that is not to say, either, that we are
dismissive of it. 
Our point, put simply, is that those who may refer to themselves or are
referred to by others as ‘insiders’ and are thus able to draw directly on
personal experiences which may be more or less shared by research
participants (see Shokeid 1997) are likely to have a different perspective on
the field from those who can plausibly make no such claim. This sharing,
we argue, as well as its lack can bring about important insights. Such
processes of reflecting on experiences and of recall are about remembering.  
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Memory
Memory, is dealt with only briefly in Writing Culture. In this collection it
looms large however. In a way this volume is a reflection on the facts that
ethnographers come to the field with memories of their own, that their
experiences there create more, and that they deploy these memories in
field notes, and, over the years, in writing. In each of the chapters that
follow, the author therefore feels it necessary to engage with the place of
memory in relation to the ethnographic self. 
Of the various kinds of memory, the contributors here are concerned
almost entirely with autonoetic memory – or in Williams James’s terms
‘memory per se’. Auto-noetic or episodic memory involves the ability to
recall personal experiences and is different from, for example semantic
memory – the recall of ‘facts’ (often characterised as the difference
between ‘remembering’ and ‘knowing’ (Tulving 1972). It is associated
with other higher-order mental accomplishments such as introspection,
reflexivity and anticipation. It is probably true to say that the contributors
to this volume are concerned more with the auto-noetic facility more
generally, even though several pay particular attention to memory. Collins
argues that the self and memory are centrally and similarly involved in all
human interaction, and so cannot be excluded from one small part of it,
that is, ethnography (see Narayan 1993). Drawing on Schank (1990), he
argues that the memory organises experience into retrievable units on
which the self draws during social interaction. In this way, then, the self in
consort with memory is implicated in ethnography, not only in the field
but also in the study. Others, and in particular Coleman and Kohn (and
Phipps, if to a lesser extent), argue that the idea of ‘flashbulb memory’, an
idea originally introduced by Brown and Kulick (1977) and developed by
Endel Tulving (1983, 1993; see also Bruner 1994), is especially relevant in
this context. In this case, a present experience sparks a memory of an
earlier experience, the connections between them generating further
interpretation. There is a proto-analysis of current experience in the light
of self-reflection: the self is the incubator of ethnography.
Furthermore, in both cases, however, memory is observed to be
embodied, that is, felt directly, rather than understood cognitively (see
Spry 2001). Of course, such embodied experiences are open to analysis in
the same way as are those experiences felt by others. What is distinctive,
unique even, is the experience itself – which gives the ethnographer a
peculiar (and seldom discussed) purchase on one’s field. Given that very
little has been published on shared (not collective) memories, the Davis
twins, in developing the idea of ‘dualling’, are in a position to contribute
significantly to the discipline of memory studies. Their claim that their
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research contributes to the memory literature at three points (memory as
material and embodied, memory as social action and interaction, and
memory as shaped by social and cultural processes) accurately identifies
the contribution that can be made by anthropology in general to studies of
memory. Skinner’s chapter is particularly illuminating in relation to
embodied experience, indicating clearly the importance of ‘shared
experience’ between ethnographer and informant. In this case, the
perception of the other that the anthropologist has experienced dance as
she has generates a palpable sense of rapport, the Holy Grail of the
ethnographer. Phipps shows how deeply intertwined language learning
and practice are with memory processes, and highlights the fact that
ethnographers as language learners undergo these processes also. Indeed,
the ethnographic experiences related in the chapters below suggest that
rapport is likely to be more deeply felt when the embodied aspects of
experiences are acknowledged and reflected upon. 
Amit and Coleman remind us that forgetting is a key component of
memory. Indeed, as Amit avers, given that memory is a process of
selection (and of revelation?) then forgetting is a part of remembering.
The question of intention arises once more in relation to memory. Neither
Coleman nor Amit suggests that the anthropologist should attempt to
dredge their memories for relevant experiences. And, indeed, Collins
argues that the anthropologist as a competent member of society will
always and already draw on their stock of experiences in making sense of
the world: what is typical of quotidian life is typical of doing ethnography.
The Self
Whilst this collection does not intend to be a systematic interrogation of
the nature of the self, it does seek to reveal certain aspects of the self and,
more specifically, the ethnographic self, through its focus on the role of
experience and memory in ethnography. The concept of the self in
Western society is a relatively modern development. The self itself is a
social construction and yet one that is persuasive within the societies
where anthropology itself is ‘at home’. Giddens (1991) locates the self as a
highly reflexive endeavour within ‘high modernity’ contrasted with
traditional societies which ascribed identities more readily through an
individual’s place within a community. Holstein and Gubrium situate the
‘social self’ (2000) within Western thought as it has developed during the
past century. 
Questions of the self and personhood have been of interest to
anthropologists for some time, beginning perhaps with Marcel Mauss
(1985 [1938]), taken further by Marilyn Strathern (1988) and the many
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anthropologists following her (Lutz 1988; Battaglia 1990; Jackson and
Karp 1990; Myers 1991 [1986]), more recently explored by Anthony Cohen
(1994) and Nigel Rapport (2003). This varied literature dwells mainly on
cultural differences in personhood, certainly the main focus in Strathern’s
discussion of Melanesian ‘dividuality’ in The Gender of the Gift (1988), and
to a degree ethnographies on personhood in Melanesia also acted as
cultural critiques of individualism in the West. Lutz, working on emotions
on the Micronesian atoll of Ifaluk (1988), makes this point apparent by
what appears to be a direct comparison of the socio-centric self in
Micronesia based on ethnographic research with the Western individual
based in her knowledge (experience?) of US American discourses. These
early works have long been criticised, partly for their focus on ideologies
of personhood rather than everyday practices (LiPuma 1998), and partly
for their superficial treatment of the Western self (Kusserow 1999). The
individual, typically based in the US American context, has been seen as
a single bounded entity that exerts agency and rational choice. On a
continuum between socio-centric and egocentric concepts it is usually
located on the most egocentric end. More recent work has aimed to
address this imbalance, showing that individualist concepts can similarly
entail socio-centric notions, and vice versa (LiPuma1998; Kusserow 1999).
However, the issue of balancing ideologies of personhood with social
practice remains a challenge, one that has been aptly taken up by scholars
working on narrative. Holstein and Gubrium refer to this as ‘discoursive
practice’ and ‘discourse in practice’ (2000). The former is the focus of
ethnomethodologists, they explain, the latter that of Foucauldian analysis.
Yet both approaches have a parallel that the authors use to describe
narrative self-construction: ‘One source of convergence would surely be
the recognition of the artful yet locally structured stories that comprise the
contemporary self in practice’ (p. 103). Holstein and Gubrium, like
Giddens (1991) and others, remind us that in this time of high modernity
the individual self is constructed across a much greater variety of contexts
than at other times in history. 
The literary or narrative turn that made this focus possible, also left its
mark on anthropology with a growing number of ethnographers exploring
self-construction through narratives. Kleinman firmly established narrative
as a way of interrogating self-construction in illness (1988). Vieda Skultans’s
engaging ethnography The testimony of Lives: Memory in Post-Soviet Latvia
(1998) uses stories related to her in letters and interviews to explore
questions of agency, suffering and culture, to name but a few. In a shorter
article Skultans explores how her informants engage with their KGB files
(2001). The interrogation protocols, she explains, are particular texts in that
they are based on a highly restricted and repetitive lexicon, they take on a
monological appearance – the language and choice of terminology of the
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interrogator is mirrored exactly in the responses of the interrogated; they are
authorless – the protocols bear no signature or similar; and they lack
representational value thus contradicting her informants’ memories of the
social realities of the narrated situations. In this situation Skultans observes
how her informants re-establish agency and self-identity in their
engagement with the files, and with her as dialogical partner. They do so
through arguing with the protocols: they read passages, and respond,
criticise and correct use of language, facts, they remember, add details on
circumstances and persons involved. This harrowing example aptly shows
that self-construction requires dialogue and relies on a perception of both the
self and the other (see Bruner 2002). 
The literature on the self in narrative highlights the social aspects of
self-construction. To begin with it requires at least two persons, as Bruner
points out: every story requires a teller and a told (2002). Secondly, in
modern times contexts of self-construction are manifold. Just like
memories, narratives are culturally and contextually bound. They must
make sense as stories to the people around. Holstein and Gubrium (2000)
go further in arguing that narratives are reactions not only to social
contexts but simultaneously serve to shape these contexts. They do so not
least because they are also grounded in the experiences of the narrator
prior to this particular encounter. 
This then means that the self is multiple, socially embedded and
emergent, and thoroughly implicated in processes of learning, becoming,
experiencing and remembering. This is also what the chapters in this
volume reveal about the self in general, and the ethnographic self more
specifically. It is indisputable that the self is central to all human
interaction. At the very least, we all draw on our own memories in efforts
to understand each other. Ethnography as the investigation of human
interaction through observation and participation is hence dependent
upon the ethnographer’s self. Moreover, memory plays a significant part
in fieldwork, and perhaps even more explicitly in the study. We do not
write down every fieldwork experience – just imagine trying to do so –
but rather carry much of that experience around with us as ‘head-notes’,
that is, in our memory. If that is so, the self with its memory will provide
a valuable resource in ethnography. 
The Ethnographic Self as a Resource
The self can be brought into play intentionally, by holding fieldwork
experiences, especially those from different fields, in juxtaposition in
order to facilitate the illumination or complication of one by the other. We
may choose to undertake projects, as in the case of Dyck and Amit, partly
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because of our previous experiences in a field and we might add that
Collins chose to study British Quakers as a British Quaker; Skinner was an
accomplished dancer before he commenced fieldwork on salsa; Nadel-
Klein undertook her study as a fellow gardener, Phipps interrogates
language learning as a former student of German, and, of course, the
Davis twins have undertaken research on twins for the most obvious of
reasons. In each case, they were consciously aware that their selection of
field site would enable them to draw on their self-narratives, which
would, in turn, enrich their ethnography. 
At the heart of each of the chapters that follow is a consideration of
what it means to be competent as an ethnographer. Social and cultural
competence is developed during the lifecourse and, whilst related to
memory, it goes further by relying on embodied knowledge that we are
often unaware of. Competence can span vastly different phenomena, from
riding a bicycle (or pony, in the Davises’s case), knowledge about whether
or not to judge somebody else’s garden (Nadel-Klein), to being able to
speak another language (Phipps). Some of our competences may therefore
be required in the field, others will be developed during fieldwork, whilst
our ethnographies may show whether we are competent authors and
fieldworkers. Competence in culture, one’s own or another, is closely
related to, and yet a step forward from, cultural intimacy. Herzfeld argues
that good fieldwork depends on a social intimacy with informants, which
then may lead to cultural intimacy (2000). Yet a question arises. When
arriving at the level of cultural intimacy and competence, have we closed
the matter to analytic reflection? Or may it be that reflexive consideration
of the acquiring of competences would serve to reveal processes of the
production of culture and anthropological knowledge that we are looking
for? This line of thought harmonises with Phipps’s observation that
important dynamics are at work at the interstices of expression between
the interiorised remembered present and the exteriorised thick
description of the field. Furthermore, Larsen, Rapport and Sˇikic´-
Mic´anovic´ show how situations where we are uncomfortable, feel at fault,
struggle with ourselves and others are moments that bring us close to
important anthropological insights as we straddle cultural conventions.
Through the varied ethnographic examples provided here, we are arguing
that such competence relies to an extent on drawing on the self as a
resource grounded in either experience or memory or both. 
There are hazards. We cannot avoid issues of ethics in admitting the self
into the field. The first question we are required to face is the extent to
which using the self as a resource is a ploy or conscious strategy. An
existentialist might criticise the adoption of such a position as an example
of bad faith – as representing ourselves publicly as something we are not.
We can assume that there is a difference between experience (for instance
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of the unity two people achieve in dance) and the faking of that
experience. This is a problem for anthropologists working at home in
particular, because the possibility of ‘faking it’ is likely to be relatively
easy. Secondly, we must be careful in implicating family and friends in our
ethnography. We may assume that those very close to us ‘will not mind’ or
even that we can speak for them in such matters – this seems to us a
dangerous assumption. Do they not become informants the moment they
enter our ethnography and therefore deserve the same respectful
treatment as informants we met during our ethnographic investigations?
Such an issue need not arise, but, when it does, it is incumbent on the
anthropologist to face it squarely. Finally, we should ask ourselves why on
any particular occasion we understand our own experiences to be relevant
to the ethnography. If writing ourselves into our texts is a trope, we need
to address the epistemological questions arising from this.
Not only serving as a resource for the ethnographer, the self might also
be drawn upon by others. We can never wholly determine the way others
see us. During interviews our research participants might, more or less
explicitly, treat us as a resource in trying to establish our position as regards
material or other resources; indeed, a certain symbolic capital might be
accumulated merely by being seen as a confidante of the anthropologist.
Alternatively, perhaps the ethnographer will be constructed as a conduit,
receiving information which he or she will be expected to pass on in the
interests of the research participant. There may be other gains, sought for
and/or achieved – a greater sense of one’s own importance for example, or
the opportunity to unburden oneself to an insignificant stranger who can
be relied upon to keep ones secrets. Larsen, conducting fieldwork in a
small Norwegian village explores these aspects of ethnographic work. 
Envoi: Towards an Integrated Ethnography
While Cohen (1994) argues persuasively for a self-conscious
anthropology, we argue further that as anthropologists we should draw
on our selves as a resource in doing ethnography. The chapters
comprising this collection aspire to an approach to ethnography that seeks
to achieve something other than reflexivity, though there is little doubt
that without the ‘reflexive turn’ this book could never have appeared.
Through this increasingly prevalent ethnographic self-awareness, we are
provided with the possibility of a different kind or mode of ethnography.
Ontologically, the new ethnography has the potential to be truly
dialogical. This clearly has moral repercussions. However, the authors
here are attempting to deal less with arising epistemological and
ontological issues, and more with a set of methodological problems: given
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that anthropologists are far more likely in the twenty-first century to
acknowledge a central role of the anthropologist’s self in producing
ethnography, how can we further shape this development in ways that
produce more interesting ethnography? 
We have attempted in this introductory chapter both to provide the
disciplinary context for the key themes that are developed in the chapters
that follow and, more importantly, to argue about the necessity of taking
steps forward from self-reflexivity and what has been referred to as auto-
ethnography. This volume explores a kind of ethnographic research and
writing that utilises the anthropologist’s experiences and memories in a
systematic fashion. We aim to show how this creates greater transparency
in the production of anthropological knowledge and how it serves to
produce rich ethnographies. We have chosen to focus on the influential
text Writing Culture but in doing so are well aware of the danger of
glossing over most of the twists and turns of the story. To illustrate this
point with a single example, here is a quote from Edmund Leach, one-
time doyen of British anthropologists: 
The data which derive from fieldwork are subjective and not objective. I am
saying that every anthropological observer, no matter how well he/she has
been trained, will see something that no other such observer can recognize,
namely a kind of harmonic projection of the observer’s own personality.
And when these observations are ‘written up’ in monograph or any other
form, the observer’s personality will again distort any purported
‘objectivity’. (1984: 22)
The experiences of anthropologists are often highly relevant for their doing
and writing ethnography. This is the case in particular for ‘native
anthropologists’, for whom this may also mean memories from times
before their professional training. Therefore, we argue that anthropologists
should include personal experiences as data in their analysis. Not to do so
seems to us (the authors of this chapter) at best to represent an opportunity
lost and at worst a moral transgression. We would go further, however, in
maintaining that no anthropologist can afford to omit consideration of the
possibility that they may themselves be their own, intimate informants. Yet
we acknowledge, reminded by Dyck in this volume, that this must also be
a self-critical act. We therefore imagine an ethnography where the voice of
the anthropologist, drawing on remembered experience, is one among
others, and by this means we demonstrate a self-conscious methodology,
which moves between the two poles of conservative self-reflexivity (as
criticised by Salzman 2002) and poetic auto-ethnography (à la Ellis and
Bochner 1996, 2002). We believe that this approach represents a substantive
contribution to and expansion of ethnography. 
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The Book
The volume addresses the themes outlined above through its chapters.
Each chapter addresses one or more of these issues. Some have a focus on
memory, others on the self, some discuss anthropology at home explicitly,
and others speak about varying fieldwork settings. Through the inclusion
of chapters from a range of countries and settings the volume aims for the
ethnographic richness and variety that have been the hallmark of the
anthropological endeavour. 
The book is envisioned to be used as a resource by readers, teachers
and students. The chapters have been ordered into three – overlapping –
sections. These are ‘Being Self and Other: Anthropologists at Home’,
‘Working on/with/through Memory’, and ‘Ethnographic Selves through
Time’. Within each section readers will find a number of contributions
that present original ethnographic material from a wide variety of social
contexts. The book can hence be read from start to finish following the line
of argument we as editors imagined beginning here with the introduction
and ending with Fernandez’s thoughtful epilogue. However, chapters can
also be read as distinct stand-alone essays, and the book may be dipped
into depending on the reader’s interests. Finally, we have attempted in
this introduction to make apparent the implicit as well as the explicit
connections between chapters though imagine that the reader will,
typically, trace other continuities (and perhaps discontinuities) that we
may well have missed. 
Note
1. There is a subtle difference here, which we will not discuss further in this
introduction.
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PART I:
BEING SELF AND OTHER:
ANTHROPOLOGISTS AT HOME
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